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1543 
A PUBLIC CONCERN:  PROTECTING 




The United States has just witnessed an impeachment debate which may 
have far-reaching ramifications for our democratic institutions.  These 
hostilities began with an anonymous whistleblower complaint from a 
government employee, disclosing what he or she believed were illegal 
activities directed by President Donald J. Trump.  Ever since, discussion of 
whistleblowers has taken on greater salience in the news cycle. 
Today, there are a number of whistleblower statutes that protect 
employees who disclose knowledge of their employer’s illicit activities from 
workplace retaliation.  Although whistleblowing is not unique to government 
workers, these individuals have an added layer of protection afforded to them 
by the First Amendment.  Free speech protections for public employees, first 
recognized in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1968 decision in Pickering v. Board 
of Education, have since developed an expansive body of case law.  Vague 
terminology and legal standards have led to inconsistent rulings among 
courts.  This Note argues that greater consistency in the treatment of 
whistleblowers is possible by refocusing on the key underlying principle 
articulated in Pickering:  the public’s right to hear information that can add 
to public discourse.  This Note proposes that the existing framework should 
be modified so as not to categorically preclude free speech protection for 
expressions made “as an employee.” 
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INTRODUCTION 
I cannot too often repeat my belief that the right to speak on matters of 
public concern must be wholly free or eventually be wholly lost. 
—Justice Hugo Black1 
More than twenty-two million public employees work for federal, state, or 
local governments in the United States.2  The modern administrative 
bureaucracy has grown so rapidly and become so expansive that it is difficult 
to discern how many federal agencies exist; the answer depends largely on 
who you ask.3  Indeed, the government is a sprawling enterprise that employs 
individuals from nearly all walks of life:  doctors, attorneys, scientists, 
teachers, members of the armed services, and law enforcement officers are 
just a few.4 
Some employees who disclose unethical or illegal activities at work to 
their “supervisors, the public, the media, or the government” are referred to 
 
 1. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 193 (1952) (Black, J., concurring). 
 2. Employment Projections:  Employment by Major Industry Sector, U.S. BUREAU LAB. 
STAT., https://www.bls.gov/emp/tables/employment-by-major-industry-sector.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/5ERM-RKCR] (last updated Sept. 4, 2019). 
 3. Clyde Wayne Crews, Nobody Knows How Many Federal Agencies Exist, 
COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INST. (Aug. 26, 2015), https://cei.org/blog/nobody-knows-how-
many-federal-agencies-exist [https://perma.cc/CWU2-SWC8]. 
 4. See A–Z Index of U.S. Government Departments and Agencies, USA.GOV, 
https://www.usa.gov/federal-agencies [https://perma.cc/ASX4-JCPL] (last visited Feb. 14, 
2020). 
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as “whistleblowers.”5  Edward Snowden is a current example, but 
whistleblowers have been essential to public discourse in the United States 
since the nation’s infancy.6  American history is flush with examples of 
individuals who brought about sweeping changes by disclosing inside 
knowledge of illicit activity, even before the term “whistleblower” entered 
the public lexicon.7  Going back as far as 1777, American sailors who 
revealed that the commodore of the United States Navy had tortured British 
captives would be considered whistleblowers nowadays.8  More recently, Dr. 
Jeffrey Wigand, a former tobacco company executive, was integral in 
exposing the industry’s deception of regulators concerning the dangers of 
tobacco products.9 
With the 2020 presidential election looming and the country still reeling 
from an impeachment debate triggered by an anonymous whistleblower 
complaint, the ability of government whistleblowers to influence the public 
zeitgeist cannot be overstated.10  Public sector employees often possess 
intimate knowledge of the inner workings of government, which enables 
them to act as society’s bulwark against governmental corruption or 
misconduct.11  Senator Charles Grassley, former chairman of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee and coauthor of the Whistleblower Protection Act of 
1989,12 has argued that whistleblowers are crucial for congressional 
oversight, which allows Congress to legislate more effectively.13 
However, whistleblowers may face severe consequences such as 
termination, reprimand, hostile work environments, or other retaliatory 
employment practices because such disclosures can negatively affect their 
superiors.14  Fear of these consequences can silence dissent, thereby allowing 
illegal and unethical conduct to thrive.15  According to Merit System 
 
 5. Joseph O. Oluwole, Eras in Public Employment–Free Speech Jurisprudence, 32 VT. 
L. REV. 319, 319 (2007). 
 6. See Stephen M. Kohn, Opinion, The Whistle-Blowers of 1777, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 
2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/13/opinion/13kohn.html [https://perma.cc/S4XD-
VNVH]. 
 7. See ROBERT G. VAUGHN, THE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF WHISTLEBLOWER LAWS 4–
5 (2012). 
 8. Id. at 4. 
 9. Peter S. Menell, Tailoring a Public Policy Exception to Trade Secret Protection, 105 
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 6 (2017). 
 10. See Letter from Anonymous Whistleblower to Senator Richard Burr, Chairman of 
Senate Comm. on Intelligence and Representative Adam Schiff, Chairman of the House 
Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence (Aug. 12, 2019), https:// 
intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/20190812_-_whistleblower_complaint_unclass.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WC2P-9KSU]. 
 11. See Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2380 (2014). 
 12. Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 and 
22 U.S.C.). 
 13. Chuck Grassley, Chuck Grassley:  We Need Whistleblowers for Good Government, 
IOWA STARTING LINE (Sept. 26, 2019, 12:29 PM), https://iowastartingline.com/2019/09/ 
26/chuck-grassley-we-need-whistleblowers-for-good-government/ [https://perma.cc/TBM5-
WYRL]. 
 14. Oluwole, supra note 5, at 319. 
 15. See Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2380 (explaining that employees are “torn” between an 
obligation to testify against their employer and a desire to avoid retaliation). 
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Protection Board studies from 1980 and 1983, conducted before the passage 
of the Whistleblower Protection Act, a substantial portion of the federal 
employees with knowledge of government waste, fraud, and abuse chose not 
to report it.16  Many cited fear of reprisal as the reason that they did not come 
forward.17  Aside from direct retaliation, other forces such as loyalty towards 
employers, damage to work relationships, and stunted career opportunities 
can deter whistleblowers.18 
Recognizing the need for transparency in all employment sectors, various 
statutory whistleblower provisions provide protection from employment 
consequences and incentivize employees to come forward.19  Such measures 
are especially important when those in power may attempt to silence 
whistleblowers for their own gain.20  As Senator Grassley put it, without 
adequate protections, “the whistleblower’s only hope is like the desperate 
Charge of the Light Brigade, and there are rarely any survivors.”21  The 
numerous whistleblower provisions in effect today are often highly 
specialized and can vary drastically depending on the field of employment 
and jurisdiction.22 
Unlike private sector employees who must rely on the shifting sands of 
whistleblower statutes to provide some cover, public employees can also take 
advantage of the First Amendment’s free speech protections.23  Because the 
Bill of Rights applies only to government actions, the First Amendment 
restrains a public employer’s ability to discipline employees for their 
expressions.24  Beginning with its landmark decision in Pickering v. Board 
of Education,25 the U.S. Supreme Court has established a balancing test for 
determining if the interests in allowing public sector employees to make 
 
 16. Whistleblower Protection Act of 1987:  Hearing on S. 508 Before the Subcomm. on 
Fed. Servs., Post Office & Civil Serv. of the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 100th Cong. 
3 (1987) [hereinafter Hearing on the Whistleblower Protection Act] (statement of Sen. Carl 
Levin, Member, S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Menell, supra note 9, at 40–41. 
 19. Jason Zuckerman, SEC Whistleblower Protections:  Dodd-Frank and Sarbanes Oxley 
Prohibitions Against Retaliation, NAT’L L. REV. (Aug. 21, 2018), https:// 
www.natlawreview.com/article/sec-whistleblower-protections-dodd-frank-and-sarbanes-
oxley-prohibitions-against [https://perma.cc/BP69-6CX9]; see, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)–
(9) (2018); 5 U.S.C. § 7211 (2018); 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (2018). 
 20. See Hearing on the Whistleblower Protection Act, supra note 16, at 6 (statement of 
Sen. Charles Grassley) (noting that the Whistleblower Protection Act was much needed 
considering “the Administration [was] seemingly engaged in a multiple thrust attack on all 
fronts against whistleblowing”). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 440–41 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting); see William 
Dorsey, An Overview of Whistleblower Protection Claims at the United States Department of 
Labor, 26 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 43, 48–55 (2006) (listing the whistleblower 
provisions that are administered by the Department of Labor). 
 23. See U.S CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
government for a redress of grievances.”). 
 24. Daniel L. Hudson Jr., Balancing Act:  Public Employees and Free Speech, FIRST REP., 
Dec. 2002, at 1, 2. 
 25. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
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certain statements outweigh the legitimate interests of their employers in 
maintaining operational efficiency.26  In Pickering, the Court’s balancing of 
the competing interests favored the employee.27  Critically, the interest in 
allowing the employee to speak was considered “as much the public’s interest 
in receiving informed opinion as it is the employee’s own right to disseminate 
it.”28 
While Pickering placed great value on the role of whistleblowing in 
preserving our most important democratic values, subsequent decisions 
shifted the test in favor of employers.29  In Connick v. Myers,30 the Court 
modified Pickering by requiring that an employee’s speech touch upon a 
“matter of public concern” before scrutinizing his or her employer’s 
actions.31  Rejecting the basic premise that it was sufficient for speech to fall 
“generally within the realm of matters of public concern” to engage in 
balancing the competing interests,32 Connick required preliminary 
examination of the “content, form, and context of a given statement.”33  
Because the term “matter of public concern” is a chameleon with as many 
meanings as there are people, lower courts have taken divergent, “sometimes 
irreconcilable,” approaches towards determining what qualifies.34 
Afterwards, in Garcetti v. Ceballos,35 the Court mandated yet another 
threshold determination by requiring that an employee speak “as a citizen” 
rather than as an “employee” to receive First Amendment protection.36  Over 
the objections of three dissents, the majority held that employee speech was 
unprotectable when spoken “pursuant to their professional duties.”37  The 
decision remains highly controversial.38 
 
 26. Id. at 568.  Pickering is the “starting point” of any legal analysis related to a public 
employee’s right to criticize government or agency policy. ROBERT M. O’NEIL, THE RIGHTS 
OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 34 (Norman Dorsen ed., 2d ed. 1993). 
 27. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574–75. 
 28. City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004) (per curiam). 
 29. Pengtian Ma, Public Employee Speech and Public Concern:  A Critique of the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s Threshold Approach to Public Employee Speech Cases, 30 J. MARSHALL L. 
REV. 121, 125 (1996); Marni M. Zack, Note, Public Employee Free Speech:  The Policy 
Reasons for Rejecting a Per Se Rule Precluding Speech Rights, 46 B.C. L. REV. 893, 909 
(2005). 
 30. 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
 31. Id. at 146. 
 32. Stephen Allred, From Connick to Confusion:  The Struggle to Define Speech on 
Matters of Public Concern, 64 IND. L. REV. 43, 48 (1988). 
 33. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147–48. 
 34. Ma, supra note 29, at 132.  Even results in the same court, decided in close proximity, 
can seem inconsistent. Compare Butler v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 920 F.3d 651, 663 (10th Cir. 
2019) (holding that speech made while testifying as a character witness in a child custody 
hearing did not relate to a matter of public concern), with Bailey v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 69, 
896 F.3d 1176, 1181–82 (10th Cir. 2018) (finding that letters sent on behalf of a criminal 
defendant prior to his sentencing did touch on matters of public concern). 
 35. 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
 36. Id. at 418. 
 37. Id. at 426. 
 38. See John E. Rumel, Public Employee Speech:  Answering the Unanswered and 
Related Questions in Lane v. Franks, 34 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 243, 246 (2017) (arguing 
that “Garcetti should be overruled forthwith”); Elizabeth M. Ellis, Note, Garcetti v. Ceballos:  
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Despite these employer-friendly alterations, Pickering’s focus on society’s 
interest in hearing from public employees on matters of grave importance 
resonates with the justifications offered for whistleblower protections in 
general.39  Although Pickering covers far more speech than 
whistleblowing,40 the interest in improving public discourse elevated public 
employee speech into the echelons of protected expression.41  Accordingly, 
Connick’s “public concern” test should be understood primarily as protecting 
speech that furthers this public interest.42  Viewed through this lens, Connick 
would predominantly shield speech with political43 or academic44 content. 
To better serve this purpose, modifying the current Pickering framework 
may be necessary.45  In particular, Garcetti’s requirement to speak “as a 
citizen” is a major obstacle for whistleblowers to overcome.46  As Justice 
David Souter recognized, whether or not an employee speaks in his or her 
official capacity need not be dispositive.47  Unlike his suggestion to include 
the Garcetti inquiry as part of Pickering’s balancing of interests, another 
possibility would be to consider it in tandem with Connick’s “public 
concern” test.48 
Part I of this Note discusses how courts analyze public employee free 
speech claims with an emphasis on Connick’s public concern inquiry, the 
ideological core of the standard.  Part II explains the difficulties of finding 
an appropriate balance between protecting whistleblowers and governmental 
autonomy.  Finally, Part III will attempt to reinterpret the Pickering standard 
to strike the appropriate balance. 
I.  THE STRUGGLE TO PROTECT WHISTLEBLOWERS 
Threats of employment consequences are powerful deterrents against 
employees speaking out with damaging information.49  As previously 
 
Public Employees Left to Decide “Your Conscience or Your Job,” 41 IND. L. REV. 187, 208–
13 (2008) (elaborating on various policy concerns that Garcetti may inhibit). 
 39. Compare Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571–72 (1968), with Hearing on 
the Whistleblower Protection Act, supra note 16, at 6 (statement of Sen. Charles Grassley). 
 40. See, e.g., United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 477 (1995) 
(nullifying a ban on public employees accepting honoraria as compensation for their 
expressive works); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 381–82 (1987) (involving statements 
expressing negative opinions about the president). 
 41. Before this, courts had accepted that public employees surrendered their right to speak 
freely as a condition of employment. See McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 
517–18 (Mass. 1892). 
 42. See infra Part III.A. 
 43. See infra Part I.E.1.a. 
 44. See infra Part I.E.1.b. 
 45. See infra Part III.B 
 46. See Oluwole, supra note 5, at 349; Rumel, supra note 38, at 244–46; Darryn Cathryn 
Beckstrom, Note, Reconciling the Public Employee Speech Doctrine and Academic Speech 
After Garcetti v. Ceballos, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1202, 1223 (2010). 
 47. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 430 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 48. See infra Part III.B. 
 49. Rodric B. Schoen, Pickering Plus Thirty Years:  Public Employees and Free Speech, 
30 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 5, 9 (1999). 
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mentioned, the First Amendment’s prohibition on actions “abridging” 
freedom of expression provides public employees with an extra measure of 
protection as compared with private sector employees.50 
Part I discusses the necessary legal background concerning the 
development of constitutional whistleblower protections.  Part I.A briefly 
distinguishes public and private employment.  Part I.B addresses some of the 
judiciary’s initial interpretations of free speech.  Part I.C explains the 
Supreme Court’s public employee free speech standard and the interests 
underpinning the Pickering decision.  Part I.D traces the evolution of the 
modern standard used to analyze these claims.  Finally, Part I.E elaborates 
on the “matter of public concern” prong articulated in Connick. 
A.  Public and Private Employees 
Throughout U.S. history, a crucial aspect of economic liberty has been the 
right to contract the terms of one’s own employment.51  Granting individuals 
the means to set out the terms of their own obligations through contracts is 
credited as an essential element of modern, market-based economies.52  Prior 
to the Great Depression, freedom of contract was considered so sacred that 
the Supreme Court invoked it to strike down New York’s attempt to regulate 
working hours for bakers in the now infamous Lochner v. New York53 
decision.54  Nevertheless, while a lack of government oversight in the 
employer-employee relationship may provide some freedom, the typical 
power imbalance between the parties can leave the individual employee with 
little room to negotiate.55 
The Lochner era’s abhorrence for any government intrusion into 
employment arrangements has subsided, but freedom of contract remains 
deeply ingrained in American labor relations.56  Even today, private 
employment relationships are presumed to be “at will” in nearly every 
American jurisdiction.57  Under this arrangement, employers are free to 
 
 50. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  In addition to federal and state whistleblower statutes, many 
jurisdictions now recognize a tort for “wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.” 
RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 5.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2015).  For a more in-depth discussion, 
see generally Joseph R. Grodin et al., Working Group on Chapter 4 of the Proposed 
Restatement of Employment Law:  The Tort of Wrongful Discipline in Violation of Public 
Policy, 13 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 159 (2009). 
 51. Matthew O. Tobriner & Joseph R. Grodin, The Individual and the Public Service 
Enterprise in the New Industrial State, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1247, 1251 (1967). 
 52. Id.; David. P. Weber, Restricting the Freedom of Contract:  A Fundamental 
Prohibition, 16 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 51, 52 (2013). 
 53. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 54. Id. at 57–58. 
 55. See Tobriner & Grodin, supra note 51, at 1252. 
 56. Weber, supra note 52, at 52. 
 57. At-Will Employment Overview, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Apr. 15, 2008), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/at-will-employment-overview.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/SF2X-CVYV].  The exception is Montana, which requires “good cause” to 
discharge an employee. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904(b) (2020). 
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terminate employment for any reason except those made expressly illegal.58  
By contrast, public sector employees can generally only be disciplined for 
adequate “cause.”59 
Since the New Deal, public and private employment have also seen 
divergent developments in other respects.60  It is still a crime for federal 
employees to strike.61  Even allowing public employees to unionize 
continues to be controversial.62  Giving unions disproportionate influence 
over public policy is seen as undemocratic,63 and some believe that 
unionization can impede government functioning in time-sensitive areas like 
national security.64  Compensation rates between public and private sectors 
also differ because public employee salaries are tied to legislative action 
while the private sector is subject only to the market’s whims, for better or 
worse.65  As a result, ever-changing policy initiatives can have drastic effects 
on the workers charged with implementing those policies.66  Public 
employees often become hostages of the divisive political process.67 
In exchange, government jobs have traditionally offered superior 
retirement benefits and job security.68  Furthermore, the civil service systems 
prevent managers from arbitrarily exercising their power to discipline 
employees.69  The Bill of Rights, a restraint on the government, does not 
apply to private entities.70 
 
 58. Union Labor Hosp. Ass’n v. Vance Redwood Lumber Co., 112 P. 886, 888 (Cal. 
1910).  Congress has passed legislation prohibiting discharge on account of the individual’s 
“race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2018). 
 59. 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a) (2018); Christopher Raines, Public Sector vs. Private Sector 
Employee Rights, CHRON (Mar. 6, 2019), https://smallbusiness.chron.com/private-sector-vs-
public-sector-employee-rights-47957.html [https://perma.cc/74JJ-4RYN]. 
 60. The National Labor Relations Act specifically excluded “the United States . . . or any 
State or political subdivision thereof” from its definition of “employer.” 29 U.S.C. § 152 
(2018). 
 61. 18 U.S.C. § 1918(3) (2018). 
 62. Martin H. Malin, The Paradox of Public Sector Labor Law, 84 IND. L.J. 1369, 1369 
(2009). 
 63. Id. at 1372; see Commonwealth v. Cty. Bd., 232 S.E.2d 30, 41 (Va. 1977) (holding 
that a local government was powerless to enter into collective bargaining agreements). 
 64. Malin, supra note 62, at 1375. 
 65. See Harry H. Wellington & Ralph K. Winter, Jr., The Limits of Collective Bargaining 
in Public Employment, 78 YALE L.J. 1107, 1117 (1969). 
 66. Compare Exec. Order No. 12,871, 3 C.F.R. § 655 (1993), reprinted as amended in 5 
U.S.C. § 7101 (2018) (resolving to improve the efficiency of government agencies), with 
Exec. Order No. 13,203, 3 C.F.R. § 781 (2002), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 7101 
(2018) (revoking Executive Order 12,871). 
 67. See, e.g., Jonathan Allen, Will Trump Shut Down the Government to Fight 
Impeachment?, NBC NEWS (Oct. 23, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-
news/will-trump-shut-down-government-fight-impeachment-n1070106 [https://perma.cc/ 
9QLR-44XR]. 
 68. These advantages may erode as the private sector responds to market demands. See 
Wellington & Winter, supra note 65, at 1117. 
 69. Id. 
 70. The Bill of Rights secures the rights of U.S. citizens against government actions. See 
U.S. CONST. amends. I–X.  These protections did not apply to state governments until passage 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
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B.  Early Interpretations of Free Speech 
Free speech, a pillar of modern democracy, is among the most enduring 
contributions of the Constitution’s framers.71  Notwithstanding its venerable 
lineage, the scope and purpose of free speech have been constant sources of 
debate among jurists.72  The right to free speech has never been absolute or 
unrestrained.73  Like every fundamental right, sufficiently compelling 
government interests can overcome an individual’s freedom of expression.74  
“The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such 
circumstances . . . that they will bring about the substantive evils that 
Congress has a right to prevent.”75  Certain exceptions lack First Amendment 
protection entirely, such as obscenities,76 “fighting” words,77 and intentional 
falsehoods.78  Such expressions “are of such slight social value” that any 
benefits derived from them are “outweighed by the social interest in order 
and morality.”79 
Limitations on free speech for public employees were especially evident.80  
Although the government was restricted in its ability to abridge freedom of 
expression when acting as a sovereign, the same restrictions were not 
applicable when the government acted as an employer.81  For decades, courts 
 
 71. See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948) 
(recognizing the right to “freedom of opinion and expression”). 
 72. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) 
(“To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious 
evil will result if free speech is practiced.”); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The only difference between expression of an opinion and an 
incitement in the narrower sense is the speaker’s enthusiasm for the result.”); Abrams v. 
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“It is only the present danger 
of immediate evil or an intent to bring it about that warrants Congress in setting a limit to the 
expression of opinion . . . .”); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (articulating 
the “clear and present danger” standard).  But see Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and 
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 28 (1971) (arguing for a more limited view 
of free speech that covers only “explicitly political” speech). 
 73. See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52 (finding that a statute penalizing obstruction of the draft 
was constitutional although there were free speech concerns). 
 74. See, e.g., id. (“The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man 
in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.”); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113, 164–65 (1973) (creating a trimester framework to balance the competing interests of 
pregnant mothers and the state); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217–18 (1944) 
(authorizing the internment of individuals with Japanese ancestry for national security 
purposes), abrogated by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). 
 75. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52. 
 76. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).  But see Cohen v. California, 403 
U.S. 15, 23 (1971) (overturning a conviction for disturbing the peace when a Vietnam War 
protestor wore a shirt containing an expletive while inside a courthouse). 
 77. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942). 
 78. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974). 
 79. Roth, 354 U.S. at 485 (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572). 
 80. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s holding that a police officer “may have a 
constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman,” was 
long the authoritative view on the subject. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 
517 (Mass. 1892). 
 81. See id.; see also Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994) (“[T]he government 
as employer indeed has far broader powers than does the government as sovereign.”). 
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believed that a public employer was free to manage workers as it pleased and 
could “impose any reasonable condition upon holding offices within its 
control.”82 
C.  Pickering and Whistleblowers 
Pickering v. Board of Education marked a seismic shift in how courts 
evaluate public employees’ free speech claims.83  Marvin Pickering, a public 
school teacher, was dismissed after he criticized the school board’s proposal 
to raise taxes in a letter sent to a local newspaper editor.84  Although many 
of his colleagues agreed with him, most did not publicly show support out of 
fear of losing their jobs.85  Lower courts ruled in favor of the school board, 
but the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the letter was protected 
speech.86  Justice Thurgood Marshall’s majority opinion was rooted in the 
public’s need to have “free and unhindered debate on matters of public 
importance.”87  He recognized that the public benefits substantially when 
those most knowledgeable about governmental institutions are able to speak 
freely about them.88 
Perhaps cognizant that the Court was breaking with decades of precedent, 
Justice Marshall did not believe it was “either appropriate or feasible to 
attempt to lay down a general standard” for all public employee speech 
claims given the “enormous variety of fact situations” possible.89  However, 
he did determine that the crux of the issue was to balance the interests of the 
employee, “as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern” with 
the state’s interests in efficiently performing public services.90  To do so, 
courts should evaluate factors such as the working relationship between the 
parties, the speech’s negative effects on the employer, and the nature of the 
issue on which the employee spoke.91  Subsequent decisions would clarify 
the balancing test further.92 
 
 82. McAuliffe, 29 N.E. at 518. 
 83. See O’NEIL, supra note 26, at 33–34; VAUGHN, supra note 7, at 5. 
 84. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 566 (1968). 
 85. See Hudson, supra note 24, at 9. 
 86. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574–75. 
 87. Id. at 573. 
 88. See id. at 572. 
 89. Id. at 569. 
 90. Id. at 568.  Possible employer rationales for restricting speech include the risks of 
increased publicity impeding operations, harm to staff morale, damage to agency credibility, 
compromising the employer’s neutrality, or fear of releasing sensitive information. O’NEIL, 
supra note 26, at 34. 
 91. Allred, supra note 32, at 45; see also Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570–71. 
 92. See Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 414 (1979) (holding that 
expressing views privately does not forfeit constitutional protection); Mount Healthy City Sch. 
Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285–86 (1977) (establishing a defense whereby an 
employer can show that they would have made the same decision regardless of the contested 
speech); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 598 (1972) (finding that refusing renewal of a 
teacher’s employment based on testimony before a legislative committee could be 
unconstitutional). 
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The nine Supreme Court justices agreed on the result, but Justice Byron 
White expressed his dissatisfaction with the new standard in a partial 
dissent.93  He saw that the majority drew on elements of defamation law 
taken from New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,94 which established that 
statements on “matters of public concern” could not be subject to defamation 
claims unless the plaintiff could show actual malice.95  Thus, Justice White 
argued that unless an employee had been “knowingly or recklessly false” in 
her statements, it was unnecessary to consider any harm to the employer.96  
The majority’s balancing test may have been a concession that, “as an 
employer,” the state’s interests in regulating employees are different from its 
interests in regulating speech more generally.97 
Emanating from the Pickering Court’s decision are two essential values 
that the First Amendment protects:  the individual employee’s right to 
speak98 and the public’s right to hear valuable information on important 
issues.99  Until then, the individual’s free speech rights were insufficient 
because the prevailing view was that most employees agreed to suspend their 
constitutional right of free speech “by the implied terms of [their] 
contract.”100  Pickering’s recognition of the public’s right to “free and 
unhindered debate on matters of public importance” allowed the Court to 
enter uncharted territory.101 
Pickering was the first time that the Court recognized constitutional 
protections for government whistleblowers.102  Congress has also enacted 
various statutory measures to protect whistleblowers based on the public’s 
need to hear from industry insiders on important issues like governmental 
malfeasance.103  Like private sector employees, public employees alleging 
governmental misconduct can turn to these statutes.104 
 
 93. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 582–84 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 94. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 95. See id. at 281–82. 
 96. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 583 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 97. Id. at 568 (majority opinion). 
 98. See id. (rejecting the notion that teachers may be “compelled to relinquish” First 
Amendment rights). 
 99. Id. at 573. 
 100. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 518 (Mass. 1892). 
 101. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 573; see KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1304–06 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 19th ed. 2016). 
 102. O’NEIL, supra note 26, at 34; VAUGHN, supra note 7, at 5. 
 103. Dorsey, supra note 22, at 47; see, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)–(9) (2018). 
 104. One of the better-known whistleblowers of his time was Ernest Fitzgerald, the former 
deputy for management systems of the U.S. Air Force who testified before Congress regarding 
a massive cost overrun. VAUGHN, supra note 7, at 50.  It was later discovered that President 
Richard Nixon had said to “get rid of” Fitzgerald on a White House tape recording. Id.  
Ironically, Nixon had introduced a bill protecting whistleblowers as a senator nearly two 
decades earlier. Id.  Fitzgerald’s claim for retaliatory discharge against Nixon was dismissed 
when the Supreme Court ruled that the president enjoys “absolute immunity” from damages 
arising from official acts. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 (1982). 
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D.  The Pickering Standard Evolves 
In Connick v. Myers, the Supreme Court revisited public employee free 
speech doctrine by elaborating on what it meant to speak on matters of public 
concern.105  Whereas before there was no separate inquiry into whether or 
not to apply the balancing test, here the Court required a preliminary 
determination on whether or not the expression touched on such matters.106  
Sheila Myers, an assistant district attorney disgruntled with her superior’s 
decision to transfer her, circulated a questionnaire among the staff to solicit 
their opinions regarding certain office policies.107  She was fired for inciting 
what was characterized as a “mini-insurrection” in the office and filed suit, 
asserting a free speech violation.108  In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court 
held that every question on the survey except for one was unrelated to matters 
of public concern based on their “content, form, and context.”109  One 
question concerning whether or not employees had been pressured to work 
on political campaigns related to a matter of public concern, but the Court 
found that the action was nevertheless justified during the balancing stage, 
considering the threat to workplace decorum.110  The Court’s decision 
characterizes the questionnaire more as a personal grievance than an attempt 
to discuss pressing issues.111 
Justice William Brennan objected to the majority’s reasoning in a 
dissent.112  He disagreed that examining content, form, and context was a 
proper method of sifting out speech on matters of public concern.113  
According to him, “[u]nconstrained discussion concerning the manner in 
which the government performs its duties is an essential element of the public 
discourse necessary to informed self-government.”114 
The Supreme Court would next breathe life into what it meant to “speak 
as a citizen” in Garcetti v. Ceballos.115  Following the lead of multiple 
circuits,116 Garcetti held that employees making statements “pursuant to 
their official duties” do not speak as citizens—and so the First Amendment 
is inapplicable.117  This meant that Richard Ceballos, a deputy district 
 
 105. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–49 (1983). 
 106. Allred, supra note 32, at 47–48. 
 107. Connick, 461 U.S. at 141. 
 108. Id. at 151. 
 109. See id. at 147–48. 
 110. Id. at 152.  The plaintiff disputed the idea that there was any harm to her employer. 
See Hudson, supra note 24, at 19. 
 111. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 154; Schoen, supra note 49, at 19. 
 112. Connick, 461 U.S. at 156–70 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 113. Id. at 159–60.  Justice Brennan also asserts that the majority weakens its argument by 
stating that some matters may be “inherently of public concern.” Id. 
 114. Id. at 161. 
 115. 547 U.S. 410, 422 (2006). 
 116. See Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2000); Morris v. Crow, 142 F.3d 
1379, 1382 (11th Cir. 1998).  Both cases found that employees speaking in their official 
capacities were unprotected although the Morris court did so as part of the Connick public 
concern test. Morris, 142 F.3d at 1382. 
 117. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421. 
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attorney, was unprotected when he wrote an internal memorandum 
recommending the dismissal of an ongoing criminal proceeding.118 
Garcetti elicited three separate dissents from Justices John Paul 
Stevens,119 David Souter,120 and Stephen Breyer.121  The primary dissent 
came from Justice Souter, who suggested an alternative framework where 
employees speaking on matters of “unusual importance” could proceed to the 
balancing stage even when they were speaking pursuant to their official 
duties.122  He argued that the inquiry should not end if an employee spoke in 
an official capacity, but that fact should weigh against First Amendment 
protection in the Pickering calculus.123  Justice Stevens joined Justice 
Souter’s dissent, adding that “[t]he notion that there is a categorical 
difference between speaking as a citizen and speaking in the course of one’s 
employment is quite wrong.”124  Justice Breyer did not join this dissent 
because he felt that this method would not adequately account for 
governmental interests.125 
This marked yet another major evolution in the Supreme Court’s analysis 
of public employee First Amendment claims.126  Two threshold 
determinations must be made to fit under the umbrella of free speech:  (1) a 
public employee must have been speaking as a citizen and (2) that 
individual’s speech must have been related to a matter of public concern.127  
The analysis only proceeds to the balancing of interests between employer 
and employee if both conditions are met.128 
The Supreme Court grappled with public employee speech doctrine most 
recently in Lane v. Franks,129 which provided an opportunity to expound on 
these two threshold inquiries.  When Edward Lane, an administrator at a 
public university, discovered that a state representative on the school’s 
payroll was not attending work, he dismissed her.130  That same 
representative was later indicted for mail fraud and theft.131  Subsequently, 
Lane was subpoenaed to testify regarding his reasons for firing her at a 
criminal trial.132  After the representative was convicted, the university fired 
Lane, who alleged that the decision was retaliation for his testimony.133 
 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 426–27 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 120. Id. at 427–44 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 121. Id. at 444–50 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 122. Id. at 435 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 123. Id. at 434. 
 124. Id. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 125. Id. at 447–48 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 126. See id. at 418 (majority opinion). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. 134 S. Ct. 2369 (2014). 
 130. Id. at 2375. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 2376. 
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Writing for the Court, Justice Sonia Sotomayor rejected the lower court’s 
finding that Lane was speaking as an employee.134  Instead, his speech was 
“a quintessential example of speech as a citizen” because of his responsibility 
“to the court and society at large, to tell the truth.”135  The Court read Garcetti 
narrowly by finding that Lane’s testimony was not part of his official duties 
even though he had learned of the misconduct while acting in the scope of 
his employment.136 
Furthermore, in analyzing the matter of public concern inquiry, the Court 
separately evaluated the content, form, and context of Lane’s speech and 
found that each supported the employee.137  The Court noted that the content, 
statements concerning corruption and misuse of state funds, “obviously 
involve[d] a matter of significant public concern.”138  Additionally, the form 
and context, which the Court analyzed simultaneously as “sworn testimony 
in a judicial proceeding,” had “the formality and gravity necessary” to add 
credence to his statements.139  This analysis indicates that the Court viewed 
content, form, and context as distinct attributes of speech that could be 
analyzed individually.140  However, Lane left numerous questions 
unanswered.141 
E.  Deciphering Matters of Public Concern 
Connick requires courts to examine the content, form, and context of 
disputed statements on a case-by-case basis when deciding whether the 
speech at issue relates to a matter of public concern.142  This procedure has 
spawned decisions that run the gamut from highly permissive readings of 
public concerns to highly restrictive interpretations.143  Unpredictability 
“inevitably chills some protected speech even as it discourages government 
officials from acting vigorously against some unprotected speech.”144  The 
Fourth Circuit simplified the question as asking whether or not the contested 
speech was just a “personal concern,” most often a private grievance.145  This 
conceptualization may be accurate in some respects, but it does not capture 
 
 134. Id. at 2378. 
 135. Id. at 2379. 
 136. See Rumel, supra note 38, at 262. 
 137. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2380. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. (quoting United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 721 (2012) (plurality opinion)). 
 140. See id. 
 141. See Rumel, supra note 38, at 246–48 (listing a number of “open questions” after 
Lane). 
 142. See Allred, supra note 32, at 75; supra notes 105–11 and accompanying text. 
 143. See SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 101, at 1311–14.  Compare United States v. 
Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 466 (1995) (determining that speeches and articles 
written by government workers satisfied Connick), with City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 
77, 84 (2004) (per curiam) (finding that a police officer’s sale of explicit content was not a 
public concern because it “did nothing to inform the public about any aspect of the 
[department’s] functioning or operation”). 
 144. Gonzalez v. Benavides, 774 F.2d 1295, 1303 (5th Cir. 1985). 
 145. Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 998 (4th Cir. 1985). 
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the staggering variety of scenarios that could involve the Pickering test.146  
Instead, given Lane’s method of analysis, a more holistic view is needed to 
examine content, form, and context in greater detail.147  The following 
sections examine each of the Connick factors. 
1.  Content 
The content of speech, namely the ideas that a speaker is expressing,148 
involves a matter of public concern if it can be “fairly considered as relating 
to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community.”149  
Because ideas that a speaker expresses are at the heart of free speech, courts 
tend to focus on this one attribute above form and context.150  Not all varieties 
of speech are treated the same under the First Amendment.151  Former D.C. 
Circuit Judge Robert Bork went so far as to argue that only “[e]xplicitly 
political speech” is entitled to First Amendment protection.152  This assertion 
was wholly repudiated in Connick itself, which states that “[g]reat secular 
causes, with smaller ones, are guarded.”153  Nevertheless, the content of 
speech plays a major role in how First Amendment claims are adjudicated, 
both in general and as part of the Connick inquiry.154  Content frequently 
associated with whistleblowing, primarily political speech, tends to receive 
favorable consideration.155 
Therefore, this section surveys how courts view various types of speech 
that constitute the content prong of Connick, including political speech, 
 
 146. See Allred, supra note 32, at 50–75. 
 147. See Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2380 (2014). 
 148. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 454 (2011) (“In considering content, form, and 
context . . . it is necessary to evaluate all of the circumstances of the speech, including what 
was said, where it was said, and how it was said.”).  Although a defamation case, the public 
concern standard is identical and Connick is cited. Id. at 452–53.  The ideas expressed by the 
speaker refer to “what was said.” Id. at 454. 
 149. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983). 
 150. See, e.g., Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2380 (analyzing content independently while viewing 
form and context together); Butler v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 920 F.3d 651, 663–64 (10th Cir. 
2019) (holding that lack of appropriate content was fatal to an employee’s claim despite 
favorable form and context); Berger, 779 F.2d at 998 (“The principle that emerges is that all 
public employee speech that by content is within the general protection of the first amendment 
is entitled to at least qualified protection against public employer chilling action . . . .”). 
 151. Political speech in particular “is central to the meaning and purpose of the First 
Amendment.” See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 329 (2010). 
 152. Bork, supra note 72, at 28. 
 153. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147 (quoting Mine Workers v. Ill. Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217, 223 
(1967)).  Bork himself would later recognize other types of speech as protected. Johnathan H. 
Adler, Robert Bork & Commercial Speech, 10 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 615, 616–17 (2014); see 
FTC v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 778 F.2d 35, 43 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J.) 
(recognizing commercial speech as protected). 
 154. See, e.g., City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 84 (2004) (per curiam) (refusing to 
recognize a police officer’s sale of lewd videotapes as protected speech); Berry v. Dep’t of 
Soc. Servs., 447 F.3d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 2006) (applying Pickering balancing to a religious 
exercise case, but also analyzing certain religious expression under a public forum analysis). 
 155. See infra Part I.E.1.a.  Academic speech, although not as directly tied to 
whistleblowing, implicates similar interests. See infra Part I.E.1.b. 
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academic speech, speech on personal concerns, and some other types of 
speech that do not directly relate to whistleblower activity. 
a.  Political Speech 
Political speech refers to expressions “concerned with governmental 
behavior, policy or personnel.”156  Unsurprisingly, many cases brought by 
government employees relate to political issues.157  Such speech is highly 
likely to be of substantial interest and value to society.158 
Rankin v. McPherson159 demonstrates the considerable weight given to 
political statements.  Upon hearing of an assassination attempt on President 
Ronald Reagan, deputy constable Ardith McPherson said to a coworker, “If 
they go for him again, I hope they get him.”160  Writing for the majority, 
Justice Marshall found that her remark about the president “plainly dealt with 
a matter of public concern”161 and that the “inappropriate or controversial 
character of a statement is irrelevant.”162  Dissenting, Justice Antonin Scalia 
was incensed, saying that this permitted employees to openly “ride with the 
cops and cheer for the robbers” without fear of retribution.163  He saw the 
expression as “violent words” that would not warrant First Amendment 
protection.164  Justice Lewis Powell cast the tiebreaking vote and found the 
statement was protected speech.165  However, he wrote separately that he 
believed it was unnecessary to apply the full Pickering analysis to private 
speech unrelated to an employee’s job.166  The justices’ disagreements were 
centered on how to classify the statement, as even the dissent seemed to 
concede that a political statement would weigh in favor of the employee.167 
McPherson also emphasized that a court’s determination on the public 
concern test often hinges on how the factfinder characterizes the contested 
speech.168  Occasionally, these characterizations turn on the speaker’s 
 
 156. Bork, supra note 72, at 27. 
 157. Most of the categories that Professor Stephen Allred identified could be considered 
more specific types of political speech, such as speech related to current community debates, 
abuse of office, public safety, public education, or discriminatory government practices. See 
Allred, supra note 32, at 50–68. 
 158. See Roe, 543 U.S. at 84. 
 159. 483 U.S. 378 (1987). 
 160. Id. at 380. 
 161. Id. at 386. 
 162. Id. at 387. 
 163. Id. at 394 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 164. Id. at 396. 
 165. Id. at 393 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 166. Justice Powell believed that “it will be an unusual case” where an employer’s interests 
could justify punishment for such private speech. Id.  As he agreed that the statement touched 
on matters of public concern, he would not have even engaged in the balancing test, unlike 
Justice Marshall. See id. 
 167. See id. at 396 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Justice Scalia instead accused the majority of 
conflating the speaker’s motive with the content of her speech to transform the statement into 
political commentary. Id. at 396–97. 
 168. See Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 998 (4th Cir. 1985). 
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perceived motive.169  Expressions that a court finds to be genuine statements 
about political issues tend to succeed, while speech motivated by more 
personal reasons will likely fail.170  However, not everyone considers it 
appropriate to consider motive at this stage.171  Doing so is also inconsistent 
with statutory whistleblower protections, which disregard why a 
whistleblower chooses to speak.172 
b.  Academic Speech 
Academic freedom developed out of the McCarthy era, when government 
officials sought to test the loyalty of university professors and expose alleged 
dissidents.173  In Sweezy v. New Hampshire174 and Keyishian v. Board of 
Regents,175 the Supreme Court established that academic freedom was “a 
special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that 
cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.”176  Educators and students must 
have the freedom to learn unimpeded, “otherwise our civilization will 
stagnate and die.”177  The precise contours of academic freedom are 
unclear,178 but public universities are indisputably a “marketplace of 
ideas,”179 which “occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition.”180  
 
 169. Professor Rodric Schoen viewed motive in conjunction with context. Schoen, supra 
note 49, at 18–19.  However, because motive appears to influence how courts interpret the 
ideas that a speaker expresses, this Note will consider motive alongside content. 
 170. Compare Ohse v. Hughes, 816 F.2d 1144, 1152 (7th Cir. 1987) (distinguishing the 
facts from Connick), and Czurlanis v. Albanese, 721 F.2d 98, 104 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding that 
“the motivations underlying Czurlanis’ [speech]” aligned with the content as falling within 
“core public speech”), with Lipsey v. Chi. Cook Cty. Criminal Justice Comm’n, 638 F. Supp. 
837, 842 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (rejecting a racial discrimination complaint as a personal dispute 
rather than a statement about office policy), and Johnson v. Orr, 617 F. Supp. 170, 176 (E.D. 
Cal. 1985) (finding that a service member’s letter revealing her sexual orientation to her 
commanding officer was a personal matter rather than advocacy). 
 171. See Rankin, 483 U.S. at 397 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (equating transforming motive into 
content with “viewing a political assassination preceded by a harangue as nothing more than 
a strong denunciation of the victim’s political views”); Hubbard v. EPA, 949 F.2d 453, 457 
(D.C. Cir. 1991) (“Hubbard’s motivation, unless personal, is irrelevant to whether the speech 
itself is a matter of public concern.”). 
 172. Dorsey, supra note 22, at 78.  Congress providing monetary incentives for 
whistleblowers is strong evidence that a whistleblower’s motive in coming forward is not a 
relevant consideration. See Hearing on the Whistleblower Protection Act, supra note 16, at 6 
(statement of Sen. Charles Grassley). 
 173. See David M. Rabban, Academic Freedom, Individual or Institutional?, ACADEME, 
Nov.–Dec. 2001, at 16, 17. 
 174. 354 U.S. 234 (1957). 
 175. 385 U.S. 589 (1967). 
 176. Id. at 603. 
 177. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250. 
 178. See Rabban, supra note 173, at 17–20 (explaining the debate regarding whether 
academic freedom is an individual right of professors or an institutional right of universities); 
J. Peter Byrne, The Threat to Constitutional Academic Freedom, 31 J.C. & U.L. 79, 139–40 
(2004) (arguing that “colleges and universities have a distinct approach to speech that deserves 
reasonable deference from society at large.”). 
 179. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603; see Beckstrom, supra note 46, at 1202 (describing public 
universities as the “quintessential marketplace of ideas”). 
 180. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003). 
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Neither students nor teachers “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of 
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”181 
Considering academic speech under the Connick inquiry, “the whole 
justification for academic freedom is that the professional speech of 
professors does concern the public.”182  “Scholarship cannot flourish in an 
atmosphere of suspicion and distrust” and the threat of employment 
consequences would “impose [a] strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in 
our colleges and universities.”183  Congress has acknowledged the immense 
public benefits of protecting academic speech in all institutes of higher 
learning by codifying the fair use defense to copyright infringement, carving 
out exceptions for “teaching . . . scholarship, or research.”184  Like much of 
copyright law, fair use is meant as a means of encouraging the creation of 
works that are of benefit to society.185 
Therefore, justifications for protecting academic speech are substantially 
similar to the rationale behind Pickering and whistleblower statutes in 
general.186  The driving force behind all this is that society benefits 
tremendously if certain individuals are able to speak freely.187  Thus, like 
political speech, academic speech should favor employees under the public 
concern test.188  Uncertainty arises when courts refuse to view academics 
speaking outside of their teaching and scholarship duties as academic 
speech.189  Speech that fosters learning may be protected, but expressions 
related to internal operations often are not.190 
c.  Personal Speech 
Speech with purely personal content does not relate to matters of public 
concern and such expressions will typically fail to clear the Connick 
 
 181. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
 182. Byrne, supra note 178, at 112. 
 183. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957). 
 184. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018). 
 185. Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1107 (1990). 
 186. See supra notes 98–104 and accompanying text. 
 187. Compare Byrne, supra note 178, at 112, with Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 
572 (1968), and Menell, supra note 9, at 18. 
 188. In his Garcetti dissent, Justice Souter expresses concern that the majority’s citizen 
speech requirement will endanger academic freedoms. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 
438–39 (2006) (Souter J., dissenting).  The majority responds to his concerns by 
acknowledging that such expressions may involve “additional constitutional interests that are 
not fully accounted for” by their analysis, but it refuses to address that point further. Id. at 425 
(majority opinion). 
 189. Beckstrom, supra note 46, at 1223; see, e.g., Colburn v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 973 F.2d 
581, 588 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding that complaints centered on how faculty at Indiana 
University were evaluated touched on only “matters of personal interest” even though the 
plaintiffs “had good reason to be concerned given the mounting hostility in the department”); 
Hong v. Grant, 516 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1169 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (holding that comments regarding 
faculty performance reviews, departmental staffing, and faculty hiring were not public 
concerns). 
 190. See Hong, 516 F. Supp. 2d at 1169 (“[I]nternal administrative disputes . . . have little 
or no relevance to the community as a whole.”). 
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threshold.191  This includes speech that may seem to implicate public issues 
but is instead found to be an extension of personal grievances.192  Complaints 
about internal operations are unprotected unless there are public interests at 
stake.193  It is still unclear if speech with purely personal content can still 
satisfy the Connick inquiry on form and context alone,194 but lacking in this 
area severely harms the employee’s chances of success.195  These employees 
may have to pursue other avenues for relief, such as whistleblower statutes, 
tort law,196 or even possibly state constitutional protections.197 
d.  Other Types of Speech 
As Pickering acknowledges, there are innumerable scenarios that could 
form the basis for employee discipline.198  Nevertheless, not all topics 
implicate the public’s interest in free and unhindered debate even though they 
may have great personal significance.199  Other types of expressions such as 
religious, commercial, or artistic speech are unlikely to implicate the interests 
 
 191. Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 998 (4th Cir. 1985); see Allred, supra note 32, at 
72. 
 192. See, e.g., Wales v. Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 82, 85 (7th Cir. 1997) (determining that a 
teacher’s memorandum was more of a private concern than a public one, “even though it has 
elements of both”); Alinovi v. Worcester Sch. Comm., 777 F.2d 776, 787 (1st Cir. 1985) 
(ruling that a teacher publicly posting letters she received from the school administration was 
an attempt to resolve her own disciplinary proceedings); Day v. S. Park Indep. Sch. Dist., 768 
F.2d 696, 700 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding that a teacher’s complaint regarding her performance 
evaluation was a personal matter); Singh v. Lamar Univ., 635 F. Supp. 737, 740 (E.D. Tex. 
1986) (holding that the plaintiff’s complaint related to “individual interests, desires, disputes 
and grievances”); Cook v. Ashmore, 579 F. Supp. 78, 84 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (finding that 
contested speech pertained to an employee’s grievance over the amount of advance notice he 
received prior to his discipline, which was “clearly” a matter of personal concern). 
 193. Compare Murray v. Gardner, 741 F.2d 434, 438 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“[T]he role of the 
whistle-blower merits protection; the expressions of personal dissatisfaction by a discontented 
employee do not.”), and Luck v. Mazzone, 52 F.3d 475, 477 (2d Cir. 1995) (affirming that a 
note sent to a radio station about the lack of air conditioning in the building where the 
employee worked was not a public concern), with Egger v. Phillips, 710 F.2d 292, 317 (7th 
Cir. 1983) (raising issues related to the integrity of law enforcement officials was a substantial 
public concern). 
 194. See Rumel, supra note 38, at 285. 
 195. In Butler v. Board of County Commissioners, the Tenth Circuit ruled against the 
plaintiff on the public concern inquiry despite highly favorable form and context. 920 F.3d 
651, 663–64 (10th Cir. 2019). 
 196. See RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 5.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2015). 
 197. The U.S. Constitution sets the lower bound of free speech protection rather than the 
limit. Joseph R. Grodin, The California Supreme Court and State Constitutional Rights:  The 
Early Years, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 141, 161 (2004).  State constitutions can contain 
independent free expression provisions, which may be more expansive. See Shirley S. 
Abrahamson, Divided We Stand:  State Constitutions in a More Perfect Union, 18 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 723, 734–39 (1991).  State courts are often hesitant to read their own constitutions 
more broadly than the U.S. Supreme Court reads the federal constitution, but some have. Id. 
at 724. 
 198. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569 (1968). 
 199. See supra Part I.E.1.c. 
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of informing the public and, thus, do not often satisfy the public concern 
inquiry.200 
To date, the Supreme Court has not analyzed a case involving the free 
exercise of religion201 under the Pickering standard.202  Some lower courts 
have nonetheless imported the Pickering balancing test when government 
employees have alleged that their employer infringed on their free exercise 
rights.203  The Establishment Clause204 complicates the analysis because the 
government is obligated to avoid taking actions that endorse a particular 
religion.205  Importantly, application of Pickering has been limited to the 
final balancing inquiry; there is no separate consideration as to whether the 
religious exercise related to a matter of public concern.206  The balancing test 
is a useful analytical tool, but as the considerations implicated in religious 
exercise cases are significantly different from those articulated in Pickering, 
applying the entire standard would be inappropriate.207 
Restrictions on commercial activity or commercial speech208 are likewise 
infrequently analyzed under the Pickering test.  However, the Supreme Court 
did so in United States v. National Treasury Employees Union.209  There, a 
class of unions and civil servants alleged that banning executive branch 
employees from receiving compensation for writing or speaking on various 
topics was unconstitutional.210  The Court concluded that this was a matter 
of public concern, but the case was unusual because it dealt with a preemptive 
restriction on the speech of thousands of workers rather than an individual.211  
 
 200. This is not an exhaustive list of other types of content for particular expressions; these 
examples simply illustrate that political and academic speech add to public discourse in a way 
that many expressions will not. See supra notes 99–104 and accompanying text. 
 201. The Free Exercise Clause mandates that Congress cannot make any law “prohibiting 
the free exercise [of religion].” U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 202. Brian Richards, Note, The Boundaries of Religious Speech in the Government 
Workplace, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 745, 748 (1998); Chaz Weber, Note, Picking on 
Pickering:  Proposing Intermediate Scrutiny in Public-Employment Religious-Speech Cases 
via Berry v. Department of Social Services, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 513, 530–31 (2008). 
 203. See, e.g., Berry v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 447 F.3d 642, 648–50 (9th Cir. 2006); Shahar 
v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1103 (11th Cir. 1997); Brown v. Polk County, 61 F.3d 650, 658 
(8th Cir. 1995). 
 204. See U.S CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion . . . .”). 
 205. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (explaining the criteria used to 
analyze claims of Establishment Clause violations). 
 206. See Brown, 61 F.3d at 658–59 (balancing the competing interests between the 
Establishment Clause and Free Exercise rights without any mention of Connick). 
 207. Neither interest identified in Pickering, an individual’s right to free speech and 
society’s interest in improving public discourse, is implicated by an individual’s free exercise 
of religion. See supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text. 
 208. Commercial speech has been defined as “speech proposing a commercial transaction” 
for “the economic interests of the speaker.” Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561–62 (1980); see David F. McGowan, Comment, A Critical 
Analysis of Commercial Speech, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 359, 383 (1990).  Advertising is the most 
recognizable form of commercial speech. See FTC v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 
778 F.2d 35, 43 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (discussing allowable restrictions on tobacco advertising). 
 209. 513 U.S. 454 (1995). 
 210. Id. at 461. 
 211. See id. at 466. 
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Commercial speech may involve expressions that would be covered under 
the First Amendment “if it were freestanding.”212  Thus, to the extent the 
expression “alludes to, or touches on, matters of collective or public interest 
to the society and engages the interest of members of the audience in 
considering such matters,” it could satisfy a Connick analysis.213  Such a 
broad ban on potential commercial speech would likely stifle at least some 
speech that informed the public, even if most government employees’ 
individual economic activity would not receive protection.214 
In rare circumstances, artistic speech may also touch on matters of public 
concern, as demonstrated by Berger v. Battaglia.215  The Fourth Circuit 
determined that a police officer’s public musical performance while wearing 
blackface constituted protected speech, immunizing him from discipline.216  
Curiously, this was the opposite of a whistleblower situation because public 
backlash to an employee’s speech prompted the employer’s decision.217  
Unquestionably, the content of the employee’s speech was artistic, but it also 
spoke to racial issues within the Baltimore Police Department, something of 
great concern to the community.218  This is likely an exceptional case 
because, generally, artistic expression is not guarded as closely as other types 
of expression previously identified.219  Still, this demonstrates the flexibility 
that Pickering and Connick sought to achieve.220  Courts repeatedly state 
their intention to avoid defining art or judging its merits.221  To the extent 
that artistic expressions touch on matters of public concern, they may satisfy 
the Connick threshold.  But more often, they would be considered matters of 
personal concern for the individual, like religious exercise or commercial 
activity.222 
 
 212. Victor Brudney, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 53 B.C. L. REV. 
1153, 1157 (2012). 
 213. Id. at 1176. 
 214. See, e.g., City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 84 (2004) (per curiam) (concluding 
that a policeman’s sale of explicit content was “not a close case” as the Court ruled 
unanimously that it did not touch upon matters of public concern). 
 215. 779 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 216. Id. at 1002. 
 217. See id. at 997. 
 218. See id. at 995 (recounting that the NAACP had protested this employee’s 
performance). 
 219. See id. at 999 (“We do not disagree with the general assessment that entertainment 
ranks lower on the scale of first amendment values than does pure political debate.”); see also 
supra Part I.E.1.a. 
 220. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 
569 (1968). 
 221. Christine Haight Farley, Judging Art, 79 TUL. L. REV. 805, 807 (2005); see Bleistein 
v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (“It would be a dangerous 
undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the 
worth of pictorial illustrations . . . .”). 
 222. See supra notes 201–14 and accompanying text. 
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2.  Form 
Form receives far less attention than content; if mentioned at all, it is 
typically disposed of quickly.223  The most accurate description of form is 
“how” the speaker expresses herself.224  Individuals are capable of 
expressing themselves in a nearly infinite number of ways, but broad 
categories emerge. 
Three political patronage cases have established when public employees 
may be removed because of their associations with particular groups.225  
Elrod v. Burns,226 Branti v. Finkel,227 and Rutan v. Republican Party of 
Illinois228 have forbidden employers to retaliate against employees for their 
association with political groups.229  Such cases are related to Pickering but 
utilize a different analysis.230 
The public concern inquiry frequently examines verbal expressions.231  
Utterances spoken with more “formality and gravity” are more likely to 
influence public discourse and are weighed favorably for employees.232  
Nevertheless, statements made in private may still be protected.233  Failing 
to protect private disclosures would encourage employees to voice concerns 
overtly rather than addressing them more discreetly, a scenario that publicity-
wary employers would wish to avoid.234 
The same philosophy applies to written expressions, the other common 
form of employee speech examined under Connick.235  Expressions made in 
a manner that can effectively inform the public are favored but not 
 
 223. See, e.g., Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2380 (2014) (discussing form alongside 
context); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 386–87 (1987) (failing to analyze form at all). 
 224. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 454 (2011) (noting that, in evaluating the content, 
form, and context of speech, “how it was said” is a relevant consideration). 
 225. Hudson, supra note 24, at 33. 
 226. 427 U.S. 347 (1976). 
 227. 445 U.S. 507 (1980). 
 228. 497 U.S. 62 (1990). 
 229. This protection does not extend to individuals who occupy “policymaking positions.” 
Elrod, 427 U.S. at 372; Hudson, supra note 24, at 34. 
 230. See Branti, 445 U.S. at 518 (“[T]he question is whether the hiring authority can 
demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance 
of the public office involved.”). 
 231. See, e.g., Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 679–80 (1994) (ruling that a conversation 
between two nurses did not touch on matters of public concern); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 
U.S. 378, 386 (1987) (finding that a statement about the president was related to a matter of 
public concern); Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 1002 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that a police 
officer’s musical performance was constitutionally protected speech). 
 232. Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2380 (2014) (quoting United States v. Alvarez, 567 
U.S. 709, 721 (2012) (plurality opinion)). 
 233. Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 414 (1979). 
 234. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 427 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 235. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 (1983) (explaining that a questionnaire 
distributed around the plaintiff’s office must have touched on matters of public concern to be 
protected); Bailey v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 69, 896 F.3d 1176, 1181–82 (10th Cir. 2018) 
(finding that letters sent in connection with a criminal sentencing proceeding were related to 
a matter of public concern); Colburn v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 973 F.2d 581, 586 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(“In the present case, the employee speech was in the form of letters addressed to University 
officials.”). 
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dispositive.236  Perhaps most crucially, expressions made in a way likely to 
disrupt office operations are unlikely to succeed.237  More obscure forms of 
expression, like symbolic gestures, do not appear to have been addressed 
under this inquiry, but analysis should proceed along similar lines. 
3.  Context 
Context refers to the circumstances under which the contested speech was 
made.238  Disentangling context from the other factors can be difficult,239 but 
there are some common issues that courts examine. 
Whether speech is internal or external to the particular government 
employer is pertinent to the inquiry.240  Issues entirely related to internal 
affairs are not seen as relevant to the public.241  On the other hand, more 
discreet disclosures are less likely to impede office operation or be 
considered extensions of personal grievances.242  The external or internal 
question is often highly fact intensive and may be considered in tandem with 
other details.243 
Context also considers whether or not the given speech was truthful.244  
Generally, the First Amendment protects true statements but not intentional 
falsehoods.245  Nevertheless, misrepresentations made in good faith can still 
relate to matters of public concern and receive First Amendment 
protection.246 
 
 236. Compare Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574–75 (1968) (finding a letter sent 
to the editor of a newspaper was protected), with Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 (holding that all 
questions except one in an internal questionnaire were not protected speech). 
 237. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 154.  But see Porter v. Califano, 592 F.2d 770, 773–74 (5th 
Cir. 1979) (“[I]t would be absurd to hold that the First Amendment generally authorizes 
corrupt officials to punish subordinates who blow the whistle simply because the speech 
somewhat disrupted the office.”). 
 238. In Snyder v. Phelps, the Supreme Court appeared to view a statement’s context, at 
least partially, as “where it was said.” 562 U.S. 443, 454 (2011).  However, the venue appeared 
to only be part of context—other circumstances surrounding the contested speech have been 
included. See id. at 454–55; see also Rankin v. McPherson 483 U.S. 378, 386–87 (1987) 
(giving consideration to the events which precipitated the employee’s comments). 
 239. See Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2380 (2014) (analyzing form and context together 
by considering the two as “sworn testimony in a judicial proceeding”). 
 240. Compare id., with Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 414 (1979) 
(finding that an employee expressing views privately does not forfeit their free speech 
protection). 
 241. Hong v. Grant, 516 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1169 (C.D. Cal. 2007). 
 242. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 427 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting); supra Part 
I.E.1.c. 
 243. Consider Rankin, where the majority determined that an employee’s statement was 
not a threat on the president’s life but rather a political statement about a public official 
because it was spoken in private with a coworker. 483 U.S. at 386–87.  Justice Powell’s 
tiebreaking vote was motivated largely by the fact that the comment was part of a private 
conversation. See id. at 394 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 244. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2380. 
 245. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974). 
 246. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 582 (1968) (finding that a teacher’s 
speech was protected although some of the information he provided was found to be factually 
incorrect). 
1566 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
Finally, certain venues appear to receive special consideration when 
evaluating context.247  Public court proceedings in particular carry a great 
deal of weight.248  Providing testimony inside a courtroom is a situation 
where the public has a heightened interest in allowing individuals to speak 
openly.249  The entire legal system depends on witnesses speaking honestly 
during such proceedings, and testimony can also serve as a public means of 
communicating information.250 
II.  THE COMPETING INTERESTS AT PLAY 
The nature of Pickering’s case-by-case approach to adjudicating First 
Amendment protection for public sector employees has produced substantial 
uncertainty.251  The same court may reach drastically different results even 
on cases decided in close proximity.252  While the standard first announced 
in Pickering was intentionally vague so as to accommodate the wide array of 
situations where employees could claim free speech violations,253 
uncertainty inevitably arises. 
The following sections focus on several issues particularly relevant to 
public employee whistleblowing under Pickering.  Part II.A discusses the 
conflicting employee and government interests that the test is meant to 
reconcile.  Part II.B delves into how the Connick factors are to be weighed in 
the public concern inquiry.  Part II.C presents the issues that Garcetti now 
poses for whistleblowers.  Part II.D questions if constitutional protections for 
whistleblowers are necessary in light of the whistleblower statutes now in 
place. 
A.  Employee and Employer Interests 
Public employees have inside knowledge and are capable of illuminating 
the government’s inner workings in ways that could be impossible 
 
 247. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 454–455 (2011) (considering that, although a 
funeral was a private event, protestors displayed their signs on public land).  More generally, 
the forum where speech is made can have a major impact on First Amendment analysis. See 
Berry v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 447 F.3d 642, 652–54 (9th Cir. 2006) (analyzing certain parts 
of an employee’s claim under Pickering and others under a public forum analysis); Weber, 
supra note 202, at 530. 
 248. See, e.g., Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2380; Bailey v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 69, 896 F.3d 1176, 
1181–82 (10th Cir. 2018). 
 249. See Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2380 (citing United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 721 (2012) 
(plurality opinion)). 
 250. See Rumel, supra note 38, at 291–92. 
 251. Id. at 246–47 (listing various questions still unanswered after the Lane decision). 
 252. Compare Butler v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 920 F.3d 651, 663 (10th Cir. 2019) 
(concluding that testimony as a character witness in a child custody proceeding was not a 
matter of public concern), with Bailey, 896 F.3d at 1181–82 (10th Cir. 2018) (finding that 
letters sent in support of an employee’s nephew in a sentencing proceeding related to a matter 
of public concern). 
 253. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569 (1968). 
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otherwise.254  Failing to protect employment, a “focal point[] in the lives of 
individuals,” deprives society of the benefits of employees’ expertise by 
stifling disclosures.255  We rely on whistleblowers, both in the public and 
private sectors, to aid law enforcement.256  Senator Grassley has estimated 
that whistleblowers have saved the federal government $56 billion since 
1986.257 
Nonetheless, restricting governmental autonomy to manage staff impedes 
efficient operations and threatens to turn every workplace dispute into a 
constitutional matter.258  Governmental entities are typically given a great 
deal of deference in the areas where they are most knowledgeable.259  Public 
employers may have legitimate reasons for regulating employees’ speech.260  
For instance, it would be difficult to argue that an employer should be 
prohibited from disciplining a police officer or intelligence agent who put 
lives at risk by leaking sensitive information.261 
B.  The Connick Factors 
In Lane,262 the Court viewed content, form, and context as discrete 
characteristics of speech.263  This made the criteria more explicit but left 
questions unanswered.264  Content appears to be the most heavily weighted 
factor, but it is unclear whether appropriate content is a necessary condition 
to satisfy the public concern threshold.265  From one perspective, because the 
content of speech is what actually serves to inform the public, it can be 
difficult to see how speech could add to public discourse absent relevant 
content.266  Conversely, finding content a necessary condition would make 
one factor dispositive, which goes against the Supreme Court’s seemingly 
holistic view.267 
This problem is most apparent when government employees testify in 
judicial proceedings—only to be disciplined later.268  Professor John Rumel 
argues that there is such a public interest in ensuring truthful testimony in 
judicial proceedings that employees should be protected, even if their 
 
 254. See, e.g., Julian E. Barnes et al., Whistle-Blower Complaint Is Said to Involve Trump 
and Ukraine, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/19/us/politics/ 
intelligence-whistle-blower-complaint-trump.html [https://perma.cc/FRQ7-VRFS]. 
 255. Ma, supra note 29, at 128. 
 256. Menell, supra note 9, at 18. 
 257. Grassley, supra note 13. 
 258. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983) (“[G]overnment offices could not 
function if every employment decision became a constitutional matter.”). 
 259. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S 837, 844 (1984). 
 260. O’NEIL, supra note 26, at 34. 
 261. Id. 
 262. See supra notes 129–41 and accompanying text. 
 263. Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2380 (2014). 
 264. Rumel, supra note 38, at 246. 
 265. Id. at 247. 
 266. Id. at 291. 
 267. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 454 (2011) (“[N]o factor is dispositive.”). 
 268. See, e.g., Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2380; Falco v. Zimmer, 767 F. App’x 288, 309 (3d Cir. 
2019); Butler v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 920 F.3d 651, 663–64 (10th Cir. 2019). 
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testimony’s content did not relate to matters of public concern.269  Even after 
Lane, there is conflict between lower courts regarding how testimony should 
be treated under the public concern test.270  Testimony before legislative 
bodies like Congress implicates the same concerns and precedent indicates 
similar protections.271 
On a more fundamental level, merely examining an expression’s content, 
form, and context may not be an appropriate analysis for uncovering matters 
of public concern.272  In his Connick dissent, Justice Brennan argued that the 
inquiry should only ask if the speech “discussed subjects that could 
reasonably be expected to be of interest.”273  He asserted that the majority 
had seriously restricted what would qualify as a matter of public concern.274  
The majority’s position was that Justice Brennan’s more permissive 
approach would cause speech about nearly anything transpiring inside a 
government office to be sufficient, “plant[ing] the seed of a constitutional 
case.”275 
Uncertainty regarding how to account for motive further adds to 
confusion.276  Some courts use motive to determine if an employee’s 
expression is really a personal grievance.277  Others see motive as largely 
irrelevant because it has no bearing on the ideas that the speaker is 
expressing.278 
C.  Garcetti’s Citizen Speech Requirement 
By imposing a threshold requirement that individuals speak “as a citizen,” 
Garcetti279 provides a mechanism for dismissing claims as a matter of law280 
 
 269. Rumel, supra note 38, at 292. 
 270. Id. at 289; see, e.g., Butler, 920 F.3d at 663 (refusing to adopt a rule that testimony in 
judicial proceedings is per se a public concern); Stillwell v. City of Williams, 831 F.3d 1234, 
1239 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding Connick satisfied if testimony contributed to the resolution of a 
proceeding where significant government misconduct was at issue); Moriates v. City of New 
York, No. 13-cv-4845 (ENV)(LB), 2016 WL 3566656, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. June 24, 2016) 
(rejecting sworn testimony that did not have any relation to a public concern). 
 271. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 598 (1972). 
 272. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 159–60 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 273. Id. at 163. 
 274. Id. at 158; Allred, supra note 32, at 49. 
 275. Connick, 461 U.S. at 149 (majority opinion). 
 276. See Ma, supra note 29, at 133; Schoen, supra note 49, at 17. 
 277. See, e.g., Falco v. Zimmer, 767 F. App’x 288, 302 (3d Cir. 2019) (asserting that 
Connick “encompasses” the speaker’s motive); Kock v. City of Hutchinson, 847 F.2d 1436, 
1447 (10th Cir. 1988) (finding that motive did not “transform his speech into speech on a 
matter of public concern”); Murray v. Gardner, 741 F.2d 434, 438 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“[T]he 
part of a ‘good government’ partisan is no doubt very attractive as the last refuge of the 
incompetent or discontented.”). 
 278. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483, U.S. 378, 397 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Hubbard 
v. EPA, 949 F.2d 453, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Ma, supra note 29, at 133. 
 279. See supra notes 115–25 and accompanying text. 
 280. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 436 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that the majority incorrectly found that statements made within the scope of employment 
should be differentiated “as a matter of law” from protected statements).  The public concern 
inquiry is also a question of law. Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 n.7. 
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before fact-intensive Pickering balancing.281  The Garcetti decision has been 
criticized as chilling valuable speech.282  It also produces counterintuitive 
results such as incentivizing employees to “voice their concerns publicly 
before talking frankly to their supervisors.”283  Furthermore, because 
Pickering already took the parties’ “working relationship” into account 
during balancing, the examination is partially redundant.284 
On the other hand, employers have “heightened interests in controlling 
speech made by an employee in [their] professional capacity.”285  When 
employees speak in an official capacity, they represent their employers and 
the government has a legitimate interest in maintaining “consistency and 
clarity” in their messaging.286  Like all employers, the government needs to 
exert a substantial degree of control over its employees.287  Public employees 
may “contravene governmental policies” when they speak out of turn.288 
D.  The Need for Constitutional Protections 
The Garcetti majority partially justified its decision by pointing out the 
numerous federal and state whistleblower provisions which can serve to 
shield whistleblowers.289  Indeed, it could be argued that First Amendment 
protections are no longer necessary in light of all these other protective 
measures.290 
However, as Justice Souter’s dissent points out, statutory whistleblower 
provisions can fall short of assuring employees that their courage will be 
vindicated.291  Congress often tailors statutes to combat contemporary 
concerns, an approach which sometimes leaves gaps in protection.292  The 
result is a patchwork of rules that can be difficult for legal experts to wade 
through, let alone those who need to avail themselves of these protections.293  
 
 281. Schoen, supra note 49, at 20. 
 282. See Rumel, supra note 38, at 244–46; Ellis, supra note 38, at 210; Zack, supra note 
29, at 909. 
 283. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 284. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 566, 570 (1968); Allred, supra note 32, at 45. 
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With all this uncertainty, combined with traditional deterrents, it may be 
surprising that anyone comes forward at all.294 
III.  BRIDGING THE DIVIDE 
To harmonize various conflicts with the modern Pickering standard, it is 
necessary to reiterate that the driving force behind the original decision was 
the idea that certain individuals’ speech better informs the public on 
important topics.295  Even though Connick and Garcetti have placed barriers 
to constitutional protection, this guiding principle can ensure that public 
employees, and particularly whistleblowers, receive free speech protection 
when warranted. 
This Part argues that, by focusing on this interest in public discourse, the 
modern Pickering standard can be adapted to better serve its original purpose.  
Part III.A focuses on clarifying Connick’s public concern test.  Part III.B 
proposes a means of modifying Garcetti so as to better accommodate this 
interest.  Lastly, Part III.C argues that constitutional protections for public 
employees are still needed despite the various other statutory protections in 
place. 
A.  Understanding Connick 
The Supreme Court’s “fuzzy” standards have caused contradictory and 
conflicting results regarding the public concern inquiry in lower courts.296  
Nevertheless, protections for political speech are particularly strong because 
they, by definition, will concern governmental affairs.297  Likewise, the 
Supreme Court has affirmed the tremendous public benefits associated with 
academic speech.298  Both are central to the core value of Pickering:  “having 
free and unhindered debate on matters of public importance.”299  At the other 
end of the spectrum is speech involving mere personal concerns, which will 
very likely fail the public concern test.300  On occasion, content of other 
varieties may favor employees.301 
Numerous courts have placed undue emphasis on the speaker’s motive as 
part of the public concern analysis.302  This can lead courts to the conclusion 
that the contested speech was the extension of a personal grievance and, thus, 
rule against the employee.303  This misinterprets Connick, which considered 
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motive but primarily during the subsequent balancing test.304  Considering 
motive is inherently fact intensive and inappropriate to evaluate during the 
Connick inquiry, which is a question of law.305  Motive can be relevant in 
determining the speaker’s credibility, but otherwise it should not play much 
of a role in the Pickering analysis.306  This is also more consistent with 
whistleblower statutes, which are unconcerned with why a person discloses 
information.307 
It is evident that content is given the most weight of the three factors, form 
given the least, and the weight given to context varies depending on the 
particular circumstances.308  Content may be the preeminent factor, but it 
should not be considered a necessary condition as this would make a single 
factor dispositive, which the Supreme Court has forbidden.309  This question 
is most pressing when public employees testify in court.310  Considering 
Pickering’s abhorrence for bright-line rules, judges must have the discretion 
to weigh these factors as the situation demands.311  Justice Brennan noted in 
his Connick dissent that rote analysis of content, form, and context is too 
formalistic to genuinely evaluate the overwhelming variety of speech that 
could implicate public concerns.312  Judicial discretion is necessary to adapt 
Connick to a wide array of factual permutations.313  For speech made during 
judicial proceedings, a court should weigh context more heavily given the 
public benefits of encouraging truthful and open testimony.314 
B.  Reconciling Garcetti 
Garcetti’s “as a citizen” requirement not only suppresses whistleblowing 
but also harms government interests.315  More specifically, it incentivizes 
employees to publicly air their concerns rather than use official channels to 
address those concerns more privately.316  Garcetti arguably conflicts with 
precedent that specifically found private disclosures to be protected.317  The 
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Court also acknowledged that the decision could endanger academic 
freedom.318 
Limiting the scope of the “as a citizen” requirement would greatly aid 
whistleblowers.  The Court may be amenable to changes considering their 
treatment of the question in Lane, their most recent foray into public 
employee speech.319  Justice Sotomayor’s use of the phrasing “ordinary job 
responsibilities” to describe when an employee spoke in his or her official 
capacity rather than Garcetti’s “official duties” terminology implies a more 
limited reading.320  Any significance of the shift is unclear, but a more limited 
reading is possible, bearing in mind the maxim that “exceptions to First 
Amendment protections should be narrowly construed.”321 
A variation of Justice Souter’s approach to speech as an employee would 
create a framework less likely to restrict informative speech, particularly of 
whistleblowers.322  To begin, Garcetti appears to imply that public 
employees are not citizens when they are speaking in their official capacity—
an inaccurate characterization.323  Rather than finding that speech spoken as 
an employee is completely unqualified for First Amendment protection, the 
Garcetti and Connick threshold inquiries could be viewed in tandem rather 
than in isolation.324  Unlike Justice Souter’s suggestion to merge Garcetti 
into the balancing inquiry, this would preserve the current structure of the 
test and is more consistent with the Court’s language.325  This design would 
require employees speaking in their official capacity to make a heightened 
showing of public concern to demonstrate that their speech touched on what 
Justice Souter calls matters of “unusual importance.”326  The precise line 
between matters of unusual importance and just normal importance would be 
hazy, but it could still be analyzed using the Connick factors, requiring that 
content, form, and context weigh more heavily in favor of the employee than 
usual.327  Such an analysis would reassert the primacy of the public concern 
test, the embodiment of the public’s First Amendment interest that Pickering 
espouses.328 
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C.  The Continuing Need for Pickering 
The presence or absence of adequate statutory measures have no bearing 
on constitutional rights that have “never depended on the vagaries of state or 
federal law.”329  A public employee’s right to free speech is unaffected by 
whether or not a legislature has extended protections to certain spheres.330  
Additionally, baseline constitutional safeguards allow legislatures to 
reinforce specific areas where protections may be lacking with more specific 
measures.331  They also guard against gaps in protection that a legislature 
may have neglected with targeted statutes.332  Recognizing greater 
constitutional protections for whistleblowers would encourage disclosures by 
public employees who can provide such a valuable service for society.333  
Objections that this burdens government employers are overblown when 
employer interests still receive ample consideration in the final balancing 
test.334  Although the Pickering standard has become somewhat distorted 
since its inception, it is still useful for protecting public employees.335 
This is not to say that the multitude of statutory protections granted to 
whistleblowers are superfluous; legislatures may enact additional measures 
as they see fit.336  With all of the psychological barriers that inhibit 
whistleblowers, statutes can be vital in providing incentives for those 
considering coming forward.337  Statutes can protect whistleblowers in ways 
that would not be possible through the Constitution alone, such as 
establishing procedures to ensure whistleblower anonymity.338  Of course, 
statutes are also needed to protect private sector whistleblowers who cannot 
rely on free speech.339 
CONCLUSION 
Constitutional protections for whistleblowers have undergone radical 
changes as the Pickering standard has evolved over the years.340  Connick 
embodies Pickering’s core value of improving public discourse by requiring 
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that speech touch on topics of societal importance.341  It is vital that courts 
analyze the content, form, and context of public employee speech through 
this lens.342  Greater consistency is possible by recognizing that Pickering 
sought to give special protection to speech that informed the public.343  
Political and academic speech most clearly fill this role, although not 
exclusively.344  Government whistleblowers, who will typically engage in 
political speech, should enjoy substantial constitutional safeguards.345 
Furthermore, reading Garcetti in conjunction with Connick could avoid 
chilling valuable speech simply because of who was speaking at the time.346  
It contradicts Pickering’s stated purpose by quashing valuable speech simply 
because an employee acted in his or her official capacity.347  Providing a 
mechanism for public employees to overcome Garcetti through a heightened 
public concern showing is more consistent with Pickering’s central 
holding.348 
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